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ABSTRACT
Malicious crowdsourcing forums are gaining traction as sources
of spreading misinformation online, but are limited by the costs of
hiring and managing human workers. In this paper, we identify a
new class of attacks that leverage deep learning language models
(Recurrent Neural Networks or RNNs) to automate the generation
of fake online reviews for products and services. Not only are these
attacks cheap and therefore more scalable, but they can control rate
of content output to eliminate the signature burstiness that makes
crowdsourced campaigns easy to detect.
Using Yelp reviews as an example platform, we show how a two
phased review generation and customization attack can produce
reviews that are indistinguishable by state-of-the-art statistical
detectors. We conduct a survey-based user study to show these
reviews not only evade human detection, but also score high on
“usefulness” metrics by users. Finally, we develop novel automated
defenses against these attacks, by leveraging the lossy transfor-
mation introduced by the RNN training and generation cycle. We
consider countermeasures against our mechanisms, show that they
produce unattractive cost-benefit tradeoffs for attackers, and that
they can be further curtailed by simple constraints imposed by
online service providers.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; • Computing methodologies→ Natural language gen-
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet is no longer the source of reliable information it once
was. Today, misinformation is being used as a tool to harm com-
petitors, win political campaigns, and sway public opinion. Clashes
between conflicting accounts occur daily on social networks and
online discussion forums, and the trustworthiness of many online
information sources is now in question.
One highly effective weapon for spreading misinformation is the
use of crowdturfing campaigns [30, 46, 75], where bad actors pay
groups of users to perform questionable or illegal actions online.
Crowdturfing marketplaces are the corrupt equivalents of Amazon
Mechanical Turk, and are rapidly growing in China, India and
the US [30, 75]. For example, an attacker can pay workers small
amounts to write negative online reviews for a competing business,
often fabricating nonexistent accounts of bad experiences or service.
Since these are written by real humans, they often go undetected
by automated tools looking for software attackers.
Thankfully, two factors limit the growth and impact of crowd-
turfing campaigns. First, they require monetary compensation for
each task performed. Larger campaigns can incur significant cost
on an attacker, and this limits the scale of many campaigns. Sec-
ond, the predictable reaction of workers often produce actions (and
output) synchronized in time, which can be effectively used as a
feature to classify and identify crowdturfing campaigns [30, 75].
A more knowledgeable attacker can apply adversarial techniques
(e.g. poisoning training data, targeted evasion) against machine
learning (ML) classifiers, but such techniques have limited impact,
and require significant coordination across workers [74].
But just as ML classifiers can effectively detect these attacks,
advances in deep learning and deep neural networks (DNNs) can
also serve to make these attacks much more powerful and diffi-
cult to defend. Specifically, we believe that in limited application
contexts, DNNs have reached a point where they can produce suffi-
ciently clear and correct content effectively indistinguishable from
those produced by humans. To illustrate our point, we focus on
the domain of online reviews for e-commerce products and ser-
vices, where millions of users upload reviews to sites such as Yelp,
TripAdvisor and Amazon. Online reviews tend to be short, and
focused on a limited range of topics defined by the application
domain, e.g. quality of food and service at a restaurant. We believe
that well designed and tuned DNNs are now capable of producing
realistic online reviews. If successful, attack campaigns using DNN-
based fake reviews would be much more powerful, because they
are highly scalable (no per-review payments to human writers) and
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harder to detect, as scripts can control the rate of review generation
to avoid the telltale burstiness that makes crowdsourced reviews
so easily detectable [30, 74].
In this paper, we identify a class of attacks based on DNN-based
fake review generation. We demonstrate that DNN-based review
generators are practical and effective, using a combination of ML-
trained review generation and context-based customization. Using
Yelp restaurant reviews as a target platform, we show empirically
that synthetic reviews generated by our tools are effectively indis-
tinguishable from real reviews by state-of-the-art detectors relying
on linguistic features. We carry out a user study (N=600) and show
that not only can these fake reviews consistently avoid detection
by real users, but they provide the same level of user-perceived
“usefulness” as real reviews written by humans.
We then examine potential defenses, and propose anML-classifier
based defense that leverages the inherent computational limitations
of most RNNs against the attacker. This leverages the fact that gen-
erative language models build fixed memory presentations of the
entire training corpus, which limits the amount of information that
can be captured from the training corpus. We show that the cycle
of processing real reviews through a RNN-based model training
and text generation is lossy, and the resulting loss can be detected
by comparing the character level distribution of RNN-generated re-
views against those written by real users. We also consider potential
countermeasures, and show that increasing model complexity pro-
duces diminishing returns in evasion, while resource costs increase
dramatically.
In summary, our work produces several key takeaways:
(1) We demonstrate the feasibility of automated generation of
product reviews for online review sites, using a RNN-based
approach for review generation and customization. Our key
insight is that while automated generation of arbitrary length
content is challenging, generation of shorter text in fixed
application domains is practical today.
(2) We show that RNN-based synthetic reviews are robust against
state of the art statistical andML-based detectors. In addition,
our user-study shows they are largely indistinguishable from
real reviews to human readers, and appear to provide similar
levels of “usefulness” utility as determined by readers.
(3) We propose a novel defense that leverages the information
loss inherent in an RNN training process to identify statisti-
cally detectable variations in the character-level distribution
of machine-generated reviews. We show that our defense is
robust against countermeasures, and that avoiding detection
involves the attacker paying rapidly accelerating costs for
diminishing returns.
We believe this is a practical new attack that can have significant
impact on not only user-generated review sites like Yelp, but poten-
tial attacks on content generation platforms such as Twitter and
online discussion forums. We hope these results will bring attention
to the problem and encourage further analysis and development of
new defenses.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We begin our discussion with backgroundmaterial on online review
systems, and content generation based on deep learning networks
(RNNs in particular). For simplicity, we focus our discussion on
online review systems such as Yelp, Amazon and TripAdvisor.
2.1 Crowdsourced Attacks on Review Systems
Most popular e-commerce sites today rely on user feedback to
rate products, services, and online content. Crowdsourced feedback
typically includes a review or opinion, describing a user’s experience
of a product or service, along with a rating score (usually on a 1 to
5 scale).
Unfortunately, many review systems are plagued by fake reviews,
e.g., Yelp [7], Amazon [37], iTunes [40] and TripAdvisor [6], where
an attacker manipulates crowd opinion using fake or deceptive
reviews. To boost their reputation or to damage that of a competitor,
businesses can solicit fake reviews that express an overly positive
or negative opinion about a business [7, 30, 75]. Studies on Yelp
found that a one star rating increase for restaurants can lead to a
5–9% boost in revenue [34].
Sites like Yelp and Amazon have been consistently engaged in a
cat and mouse battle with fake reviews, as attackers try to adapt
and bypass various defense schemes [18]. Yelp’s review filter system
flags suspicious reviews and even raises an alert to the consumer if
a business is suspected of engaging in large-scale opinion manipu-
lation [82].
Recently, attacks have been known to generate highly deceptive
(authentic looking) fake reviews written by paid users. Much of
this comes from malicious crowdsourcing marketplaces, known as
crowdturfing systems, where a large pool of human workers provide
on-demand effort for completing various malicious tasks [54, 59]. In
the next section, we introduce an attack powered by an AI program
that can replace human writers and achieve high attack success.
2.2 Our Attack Model
We assume the attacker’s goal is to use an AI program to generate
fake reviews that are indistinguishable from real reviews written
by human users. We only focus on the generation of review text,
which is crucial to deceive users and to manipulate their opinion.
We do not consider the manipulation of metadata associated with
a review or reviewer. Metadata can include any information other
than the textual content, e.g., reviewer reputation, review history,
posting date and IP address.
Key Insight. There have been significant recent advances in build-
ing probabilistic generative language models on Neural Networks,
specifically Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). Even trained on
large datasets, RNNs have generally fallen short in producing writ-
ing samples that truly mimic human writing [50]. However, our
insight is that the quality of RNN-generated text is likely more than
sufficient for applications relying on domain-specific, short length
user-generated content, e.g., online reviews.
Assumptions.
• The attacker has access to a corpus of real reviews to train
the generative language model. Popular sites like Yelp have
already released large review datasets [81]. Attackers can also
Attacker Human Writer
(a) Human-based attack.
Attacker AI Program
(b) Machine-based attack.
Figure 1: Fake review attack: Human-based vs. Machine-
based.
download reviews, or large review datasets made public by
researchers [15, 35, 38].
• The attacker has knowledge of the domain of a product (e.g.,
cameras) or business (e.g., restaurants, clothing stores) which
allows training on a review corpus that matches the domain.
• The attacker has access to sufficient computational resources
for training neural networks. Today, commodity GPU ma-
chines can efficiently train DNNs, and can be purchased or
accessed in the Cloud [36]. More recently, building and train-
ing an ML model in the Cloud has become easier with the
emergence of Machine Learning as a Service platforms [80].
2.3 RNNs vs. Crowdsourced Authors
Traditional attacks using fake reviews typically hire human writers
to write reviews. Instead, our work considers automated, machine-
based review attacks leveraging DNN-based language models (see
Figure 1). Here, we compare the two approaches and highlight the
benefits of automated review attacks.
The key difference between these two approaches is the quality
of writing in the generated text content. To influence user opin-
ion and alter decisions, fake reviews need to be written in such
a way to mimic content written by real users. Broken grammar,
misspellings and broken context can make a review appear fake. Ex-
isting machine-based text generations techniques, such as n-gram
models and template-based models are known to have limitations in
generating realistic-looking text [42, 78]. Hence, the reviews gener-
ated based on those techniques are likely to be identified as fake
by readers [84]. In contrast, a generative RNN model can generate
much more coherent text [2, 43], but still falls short for larger types
of content [50].
There are some obvious benefits to using a software-controlled
RNN to generate fake reviews. First, it removes the cost of paying
human writers, which costs $1-$10 per review on Yelp according
to prior work [55]. To further obtain an independent estimate, we
search Blackhat SEO Forum1 for “Yelp reviews,” and observe an
average price of $19.6 per review based on a random sample of 20
posts. Perhaps more importantly, software generators can control
the specific timing and output of reviews, so they are harder to de-
tect. When attackers launch large-scale fake review campaigns
1https://www.blackhatworld.com/
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Figure 2: RNN generative model training.
using human writers, workers tend to rapidly generate the re-
quested reviews, producing a burst in new reviews that is easily
detected [30, 74].
2.4 RNN as a Text Generative Model
We provide background on text generation using Recurrent Neural
Networks.
Neural Networks are computational models that use a connected
network of neurons to solve machine learning tasks. Neurons serve
as the basic computational units in a Neural Network. In this work,
we focus on a specific class of Neural Networks known as Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs), which are better suited for sequential
data. RNNs can learn from a large corpus of natural language text
(character or word sequences), to generate text at different levels
of granularity, i.e. at the character level or word level. We focus
on a character-level RNN due to its recent success on generating
high quality text [14, 28]. Also, the memory and computational cost
required to train a character-level RNN is lower than word-level
RNN since number of words is significantly larger than number of
valid characters in the English Language.
RNN Training. As mentioned before, traditional language models
(e.g., n-gram models) exhibit limited performance when trained
on long text sequences since they are able to look back only a
few steps of the sequence. RNN solves this problem by building a
more sophisticated “memory” model which maintains long term
information about what it has seen so far. In an RNN, “memory” is
a set of high dimensional weights (hidden states) learned during
the training stage to capture information about all characters seen
in the training sequence.
Figure 2 illustrates the training process of an RNN-based text
generation model. At each time step t , a new character xt is fed as
input to a memory unit of the RNN that maintains a hidden state ht,
and provides an output ot. Then it compares the current output ot
with the desired output, which is the next character in the text. The
error between them is computed and the hidden states are updated
towards the direction where the error is minimized. After multiple
iterations of updates, the hidden layer will eventually capture the
relationship between each input character and all characters prior
to it, i.e. the conditional probability distribution P(xt+1|(x1, . . . , xt)).
Text Sampling. After an RNN model is trained, text can be gener-
ated by feeding a character, say x˜0, to the trained RNN. The RNN
returns a probability distribution that defines which characters are
likely to occur next, i.e. P(x˜1 |x˜0). We stochastically sample from
this distribution to obtain the next character x˜1. Next, by feeding
Target Review PlatformOnline Review Corpus
RNN Training Initial Review Generation
Trained RNN
Uncustomized Review 
Review Customization
Existing Reviews
Customized Review 
Figure 3: Overview of our attack methodology.
x˜1 back in to the RNN, we obtain another probability distribution
predicting the next character, i.e. P(x˜2 |x˜0, x˜1). This process can be
repeated to generate continuous text x˜0, x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜N.
Temperature Control. An important parameter that we can ma-
nipulate during the sampling stage is temperature. Temperature is a
parameter used in the softmax function during the sampling stage
when converting the output vector ot to a probability distribution.
Formally:
P(xt |(x1, . . . , xt-1)) = softmax(ot) (1)
eachot is a N-dimentional vector where N is the size of the character
vocabulary. The softmax function is defined as:
P(softmax(ot) = k) = e
okt /T∑N
j=1 e
ojt/T
(2)
Here, okt represents the component of the output corresponding
to the character class k (in the vocabulary), at time t , for a given
temperature, T .
Temperature controls the “novelty” of generated text. Tempera-
tures lower than 1 amplifies the difference in the sampling probabil-
ity for each character. In other words, this reduces the likelihood of
the RNN to pick characters with lower probabilities, in preference of
more common characters. As a result, this constrains the sampling,
and generates less diverse text, and more potentially repetitive
patterns. As temperature increases, the variation of sampling prob-
ability for each character diminishes, and the RNN will generate
more “novel” and diverse text. But along with diversity comes a
higher risk of mistakes (e.g., spelling errors, context inconsistency
errors etc.).
3 ATTACK METHODOLOGY AND SETUP
We focus our study on Yelp, the most popular site for collecting
and sharing crowdsourcing user reviews. Yelp’s review system is
representative of other review systems, e.g., Amazon or TripAdvi-
sor. In this section, we describe details of our attack methodology,
datasets and training setup.
3.1 Attack Methodology
Our attack methodology is illustrated in Figure 3. At a high level,
the attack consists of two main stages: (1) The first stage starts
by training a generative language model on a review corpus. The
language model is then used to generate a set of initial reviews. (2)
In the second stage, a customization component further modifies
these reviews to capture specific information about the target entity
(e.g., names of dishes in a seafood restaurant), and produces the
final targeted fake review. In our experiments, the customizable
content is extracted from a reference dataset, composed of existing
reviews associated with the target entity. If there are no existing
reviews, an attacker can build a reference dataset using reviews of
entities in the same category (e.g., seafood restaurants) as the target.
Restaurant category metadata is available on Yelp and similar sites,
and can be used to identify similar entities.
Generating Initial Reviews. First, the attacker chooses a training
dataset that matches the domain of the target entity. For example, to
generate reviews targeting restaurants, the attacker would choose a
dataset of restaurant reviews. Next, the attacker trains a generative
RNN model using the dataset. Afterwards, the attacker generates
review text using the sampling procedure in Section 2.4. Note that
the attacker is able to generate reviews at different temperatures.
Review Customization. In general, there is no control over the
topic or context (e.g., name of a food in a restaurant) generated
from the RNN model, since the text is stochastically sampled based
on the character distribution. To better target an entity (e.g., restau-
rant), we further capture the context by customizing the generated
reviews with domain-specific keywords. This is analogous to crowd-
sourced fake review markets, where workers are typically provided
additional information about the target entity for a writing task [59].
The information consists of specific nouns (e.g., names of dishes)
to be included in the written review. Based on this observation, we
propose an automated noun-level word replacement strategy.
Our method works by replacing specific words (nouns) in the
initial review with new words that better capture the context of the
target entity. This involves three main steps:
(1) Choose the type of contextual information to be captured. The
attacker first chooses a keyword C that helps to identify the
context. For example, if the attacker is targeting a restaurant,
the keyword can be “food,” which will capture the food-related
context. If the target is an online electronic accessories store,
then the keyword can be “accessory” or “electronics.”
(2) Identify words in reviews of the reference dataset that capture
context. Next, our method identifies all the nouns in the refer-
ence dataset that are relevant to the keyword C . Relevancy is
estimated by calculating lexical similarity using WordNet [44],
a widely used lexical database that groups English words into
sets of synonyms and measures their concept relatedness [51].
We identify a set of words p in the reference dataset that have
high lexical similarity with the keyword C , using a similarity
I love this place. I love their 
sushi. The salmon and ramen are 
also delicious. I will continue to 
come here anytime I am in town.
Review 1: Easily my favorite Italian restaurant. I love the taster menu, everything is amazing on it. I 
suggest the carpaccio and the asparagus. Sadly it has become more widely known and becoming diffi-
cult to get a reservation for prime times.
Review 2: I come here every year during Chrismas and I absolutely love the pasta! Well worth the price!
Review 3: Excellent pizza, lasagna and some of the best scallops I've had. The dessert was also exten-
sive and fantastic.                    
                                                             ....
I love this place. I love their aspar-
agus. The scallops and pasta are 
also delicious. I will continue to 
come here anytime I am in town.
Initial Review Customized Review 
Reviews From the Reference Dataset 
Figure 4: Example of review customization.
threshold MINsim. The set of words p captures the context of
the target entity.
(3) Identify words in initial reviews for replacement. Finally, we find
all the nouns in the review set R that are also relevant toC using
the same method in Step 2. We replace them by stochastically
sampling words in p based on the lexical similarity score.
A detailed version of the above algorithm is available in Appen-
dix A. Figure 4 shows an example of customizing an initial review
that has language more suitable for a Japanese restaurant, to a
review more suitable for an Italian restaurant. The nouns to be
replaced in the initial review are marked in green, and replacement
nouns are marked in blue. Note that we choose this noun-level
replacement strategy because of its simplicity, and there is scope
for further improvement of this technique.
3.2 RNN Training and Text Generation
Training Process. For all experiments, we use a Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) model [16], an RNN variant that has shown better
performance in practice [22]. We examine multiple RNN training
configurations used in prior work [14, 33] and determine the best
configuration empirically through experiments. The neural network
we used contains 2 hidden layers, each with 1,024 hidden units. For
training, the input string is split into batches of size 256. Training
loss is computed using cross-entropy [12], and weights are updated
using Adam [26] optimization, a common optimization technique
for neural network training. The model is trained for 20 epochs and
the learning rate is set to be 2×10-3 and decays to half of the current
rate every time when the loss increases for 5 successive batches. We
also monitor training loss and inspect generated reviews to avoid
underfitting or overfitting.
We pre-processed the review text by removing all extra white
space and non-ASCII characters. Additionally, we separate the re-
views in the corpus by the delimiter tokens “<SOR>” (start of review)
and “<EOR>” (end of review), so the model also learns when to
start and end a review by generating these two tokens. The RNN is
trained using a machine with Intel Core i7 5930K CPU and a Nvidia
TITAN X GPU. The training takes ∼72 hours.
Text Generation. Once we have trained the language model, we
can sample the review text at different temperatures. We generate
reviews at 10 different temperatures between 0 and 1: [0.1, 0.2, ...,
Dataset # ofRestaurants
# of Fake
Reviews (%)
# of Real
Reviews (%)
YelpBos [45] 1,028 28,151 (22.12%) 99,117
YelpSF [45] 3,466 90,777 (9.94%) 822,772
YelpZip [56] 4,204 84,484 (13.76%) 529,569
YelpNYC [56] 914 37,799 (10.48%) 322,858
YelpChi [48] 98 8,401 (12.83%) 57,061
Total 9,710 249,612 (11.99%) 1,831,377
Table 1: Summary of ground-truth dataset.
1]2. To start the text generation process, the model is seeded with
the start of review delimiter token. Conversely, the model identifies
the end of a review by generating the closing delimiter token.
For review customization, we chose the target keyword C to be
“food,” as a large number of nouns unsurprisingly relate to food. We
set the other parameter MINsim to 0.2. After customization, overall,
98.4% of the reviews have at least one word replaced. The reviews
not affected by the customization lack suitable content (or words)
that capture the context, including reviews that rarely mention any
food or dish in the text, e.g., “I love this place! Will be back again!!”
Generated Text Samples. Table 2 shows several examples of re-
views generated at different temperatures. At higher temperatures,
the RNN is more likely to generate novel content, while at lower
temperatures, the RNN produces repetitive patterns. We include
more examples of generated reviews in Appendix B.
3.3 Datasets
For our evaluation, we use different datasets of restaurant reviews
on Yelp. Each review in a dataset contains the text of the review, the
identity of the target restaurant and a desired rating score, ranging
from one to five stars. The rating score determines the sentiment
of the review and the desired textual content.
In the rest of the paper, we present results based on the genera-
tion of reviews tailored towards a five-star rating. This considers
the common scenario of an attack trying to improve the reputation
of a restaurant. Our attack methodology is general and would be
the same for other ratings as well. Appendix B presents examples of
generated reviews tailored towards one-star and three-star ratings.
Three disjoint datasets of Yelp reviews are used for generat-
ing and evaluating the attack: a training, ground-truth, and attack
dataset.
Training Datasets.We use the Yelp Challenge dataset to train the
RNN language model, containing a total of 4.1M reviews by 1M
reviewers, collectively targeting 144K businesses [81]. The dataset
covers restaurants in 11 cities, spread across 4 countries. We extract
reviews corresponding to different ratings, and found 617K reviews
with a five-star rating from 27K restaurants. In total, these five-star
reviews contain 57M words and 304M characters, a sufficiently
large dataset for training an RNN.
2We do not experiment with temperatures beyond 1.0, because the sampling distribu-
tion would significantly diverge from the true distribution learned from the training
corpus, and lead to overly diverse and incoherent text.
Ground-truthDataset.This dataset, listed in Table 1, comprises of
multiple Yelp review datasets released by researchers. By providing
ground-truth information about existing fake and real reviews on
Yelp, this dataset enables us to build machine learning fake review
classifiers to evaluate our attack success (Section 4.1). Similar to
previous work [45, 48, 56], we treat Yelp filtered and unfiltered
reviews as ground-truth information for fake and real reviews. Yelp
attempts to filter reviews that are “fake, shill or malicious” [79],
but acknowledges imperfections in the accuracy of the filter [82].
However, given this is the best information currently available and
used by many prior studies on fake reviews, we use it to establish
ground-truth. In the rest of the paper, we use fake and real reviews
to refer to Yelp filtered and Yelp unfiltered reviews, respectively.
For each dataset, we only consider reviews targeting restaurants3.
The resulting dataset contains restaurants in NYC, Chicago, SF,
Boston, and several cities in NJ, VT, CT, and PA.
Attack Dataset. This dataset contains the reviews generated by
our RNN language model. We use the attack dataset to evaluate
attack performance (Section 4) and defense schemes (Section 5).
The datasets contain similar data to the ground-truth dataset,
except for replacing all fake reviews with our machine-generated
reviews. Using our RNN model, we generate reviews targeting each
restaurant in the ground-truth dataset using different temperatures.
For each temperature, we generate as many reviews as fake re-
views from Yelp for each restaurant, i.e. 249,612 machine-generated
reviews targeting 9,710 restaurants.
4 EVALUATING QUALITY OF
MACHINE-GENERATED REVIEWS
In this section, we evaluate the quality of machine-generated re-
views along two dimensions. First, we investigate whether gen-
erated reviews can bypass detection by existing algorithmic ap-
proaches. Second, we conduct an end-to-end user study, by pre-
senting restaurant reviews containing both generated reviews and
real reviews to human judges. Our goal is to understand whether
humans can distinguish generated reviews from real reviews.
4.1 Detection by Existing Algorithms
We focus on two popular algorithmic techniques to distinguish
machine-generated reviews from real reviews: (1) a supervised ML
scheme based on linguistic features, (2) a plagiarism detector to
check for duplications between machine-generated reviews and
training set (real) reviews.
ML-based Review Filter. Using machine learning classifiers to
detect fake reviews is a well studied problem [20, 48, 53]. Most of
the prior works rely on the observation that characteristics of fake
reviews deviate from real reviews along many linguistic dimen-
sions. We identified 5 groups of linguistic features, consisting of 77
features total that previously demonstrated strong discriminatory
power for distinguishing fake and real reviews. We describe the
features below:
• Similarity feature (1): Captures inter-sentence similarity within
a review at the word level. It is computed as the maximum
3Since Yelp also includes reviews for non-restaurant business, e.g., hair salon and car
service.
cosine similarity between unigram features among all pairs of
sentences [10, 20, 31, 56].
• Structural features (4): Captures the structural aspects of a
review. Individual features include the number of words, the
number of sentences, the average sentence length (# of words)
and the average word length (# of characters) [20, 56].
• Syntactic features (6): Captures the linguistics properties of
the review based on parts-of-speech (POS) tagging. Features
include (distinct) percentages of nouns, verbs, adjectives and
adverbs, first personal pronouns, and second personal pro-
nouns [20, 31, 56].
• Semantic features (4): Captures the subjectivity and sentiment
of the reviews. Features include percentage of subjectivewords,
percentage of objective words, percentage of positive words
and percentage of negative words. All these features are de-
fined in SentiWordNet [3], a popular lexical resource for opin-
ion mining [31, 53, 56].
• LIWC features (62): The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) software [52] is a widely used text analysis tool in the
social sciences. It categorizes ∼4,500 keywords into ∼68 psy-
chological classes (e.g., linguistic processes, psychological pro-
cesses, personal concerns and spoken categories). We use the
percentage of word count in each class as a feature, and exclude
the features already included in the previous groups [48, 49].
We train a linear SVM classifier on the Yelp ground-truth dataset,
composed of real reviews (Yelp unfiltered reviews), and fake reviews
(Yelp filtered reviews). After training with all 77 linguistic features,
we tested the performance of the classifier on the Yelp attack dataset,
composed of real reviews and machine-generated reviews. We run
10-fold cross validation and report the average performance.
Evaluation of attack performance uses precision (percentage of
reviews flagged by the classifier that are fake reviews), and recall
(percentage of fake reviews flagged by the classifier). Figure 5 shows
the precision and recall of the classifier when applied to machine-
generated reviews generated from different temperatures (along
with real reviews), with lower values indicating higher performing
attacks. Overall, we observe high performing attacks at all temper-
atures. The best attack is at temperature 1.0, with a low precision
of 18.48%, and a recall of 58.37%. Low precision indicates the in-
ability of the ML classifier to distinguish between real reviews and
machine-generated reviews.
In Figure 5, we observe that attack performance increases with
temperature. To further understand this trend, we analyze how
the linguistic features of the generated text vary as we increase
temperature. In Figure 7, we compare the average value of a lin-
guistic feature of generated reviews with real reviews at different
temperatures. We show results for 3 linguistic features across 3 cat-
egories, and other features exhibit similar trends. In general, feature
values of the machine-generated reviews diverge from real reviews
at low temperatures, and converge as temperature increases, thus
making it harder to distinguish them from real reviews at high
temperatures.
PlagiarismDetector.Achieving reasonable linguistic quality does
not rule out the possibility of being fake. A simple attack involves
generating fake reviews by duplicating or partially copying from
real reviews. In such cases, the review quality would be quite good,
Temperature Generated Review Text
0.1
I love this place! I have been here a few times and have never been disappointed. The service
is always great and the food is always great. The staff is always friendly and the food is always
great. I will definitely be back and try some of their other food and service.
0.5 I love this place. I have been going here for years and it is a great place to hang out with friendsand family. I love the food and service. I have never had a bad experience when I am there.
0.7
My family and I are huge fans of this place. The staff is super nice and the food is great. The
chicken is very good and the garlic sauce is perfect. Ice cream topped with fruit is delicious
too. Highly recommended!
1.0 I had the grilled veggie burger with fries!!!! Ohhhh and taste. Omgggg! Very flavorful! It wasso delicious that I didn’t spell it!!
Table 2: Example of the generated five-star fake reviews targeting at a buffet restaurant in NYC. More examples of generated
reviews are included in the Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Performance of linguistic classifier on detecting
machine-generated reviews.
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Figure 6: Plagiarism similarity score. Each point shows me-
dian, 25th and 75th percentile of the score distribution.
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Figure 7: Change of linguistic feature values when temperature varies.
and would pass the linguistic filter. Standard solution is to rely
on plagiarism checkers to identify the duplicate or near-duplicate
reviews. Given that the RNN model is trained to generate text
similar to the training set, we examine if the machine-generated
reviews are duplicates or near-duplicates of reviews in the training
set.
To conduct a plagiarism check, we assume that the service
provider has access to a database of reviews used for training the
RNN. Next, given a machine-generated review, the service provider
runs a plagiarism check by comparing it with reviews in the data-
base. This is a best case scenario for a plagiarism test, and helps us
understand its potential to detect generated reviews.
We use Winnowing [63], a widely used method to identify dupli-
cate or near-duplicate text. For a suspicious text, Winnowing first
generates a set of fingerprints by applying a hashing function to
a set of substrings in the text, and then compares the fingerprints
between the suspicious text and the text in database. Similarity be-
tween two reviews is computed using Jaccard Similarity [5] of their
fingerprints generated from Winnowing. The plagiarism similarity
score for a single review is computed as the max similarity with all
the other reviews in the dataset, and ranges from 0 to 1 (1 indicates
identical reviews).
We pick a random sample of 10K machine-generated reviews for
the plagiarism test, and the database (for comparison) includes the
entire Yelp training dataset. Figure 6 shows the quantiles of similar-
ity scores at different temperatures. Each point shows median, 25th
and 75th percentile of the plagiarism score distribution. In addi-
tion, we also show the similarity score distribution for real reviews,
which serves as a baseline for comparison. Note that scores for real
reviews do not vary with temperature. We obverse that plagiarism
scores of machine-generated reviews are low at all temperatures
(lower score represents smaller probability of copying) and decrease
as temperature increases. In addition, machine-generated reviews
and real reviews show similar plagiarism scores, thus making them
harder to distinguish. For example, at temperature 1.0, if we set a
plagiarism score threshold such that 95% of real reviews are not
flagged, we observe that 96% of machine-generated reviews still by-
pass the check. Thus, it remains hard to detect machine-generated
reviews using a plagiarism checker without inadvertently flagging
a large number of real reviews. This shows that the RNN does not
simply copy the existing reviews from the training set.
4.2 Evaluation by User Study
Regardless of how well machine-generated reviews perform on
statistical measures and tests, the real test is whether they can
pass for real reviews when read by human users. In this section,
we conduct an end-to-end user study to evaluate whether human
examination can detect machine-generated reviews. In practice,
service providers are known to involve human content moderators
to separatemachine-generated reviews from real reviews [70]. More
importantly, these tests will tell us how convincing these reviews
are to human readers, and whether they will accomplish their goals
of manipulating user opinions.
User Study to Detect Machine-Generated Reviews. To mea-
sure human performance, we conduct surveys4 on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (AMT5). Each survey includes a restaurant name,
description (explaining the restaurant category and description
provided by the business on Yelp), and a set of reviews, which in-
cludes machine-generated reviews and real reviews written for that
restaurant. We then ask each worker to mark reviews they consider
to be fake, using any basis for their judgment.
For our survey, we choose 40 restaurants with the most number
of reviews in our ground-truth dataset. For each restaurant, we
generate surveys, each of which include 20 random reviews, out of
which some portion (X ) are machine-generated reviews, and the
rest are real reviews from Yelp. The number X is randomly selected
between 0 to 5 so that the expected ratio of fake reviews (12.5%)
matches the real world setting (11.99% in Table 1). Additionally, we
control the quality of real reviews shown in the surveys to cover
the full range of usefulness. We leverage the review usefulness (a
simple count of the number of users who found the review to be
useful) metadata provided by Yelp for each review.
4Prior to conducting our study, we submitted a human subject protocol and received
approval from our local IRB board.
5https://www.mturk.com/
For each of our 40 restaurants, we generated reviews using 5
different temperature parameters: [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1.0]. We give
each unique survey to 3 different workers, giving us a total of 600
surveys. Out of these 600 responses, we discarded 6 because they
did not mark the gold standard reviews. Gold standard reviews are
basically strings of random characters (i.e. meaningless text), that
looks clearly fake to any worker. Lastly, we only request master
workers6 located in the US to guarantee English literacy. We show
an example of our survey in the Figure 15(a) in Appendix C.
Figure 8 shows the human performance results as we vary the
temperature. First, we observe that machine-generated reviews
appear quite robust against a human test. Under the best configura-
tion, the precision is only 40.6% with a recall of 16.2%. In addition,
similar to algorithmic detection, attack performance improves as
temperature increases. This is surprising, since we would expect
that reviews at the extreme high or low temperature parameters
would be easily flagged (either too repetitive or too many gram-
matical/spelling errors). We saw earlier that higher temperature
produced reviews more statistically similar to real reviews, but ex-
pected errors to make those reviews detectable by humans. Instead,
it seems that human users are much more sensitive to repetitive
errors than they are to small spelling or grammar mistakes. We do
observe that the best attack performance occurs at a high temper-
ature of 0.7, which is marginally better than the performance at
temperature of 1.0.
Helpfulness of Machine-Generated Reviews. Previously, we
showed that humans tend to mark many machine-generated re-
views as real. This raises a secondary question: Formachine-generated
reviews that are not caught by humans, do they still have sufficient
quality to be considered useful by a user? Answering this question,
takes us a step further towards generating highly deceptive fake
reviews. We run a second round of AMT surveys to investigate this
question.
In each survey, we first asked the workers to mark reviews as
fake or real. Additionally, for the reviews marked as real, we asked
for a rating of the usefulness of the review on a scale from 1 to 5
(1 as least useful, 5 as most useful). An example of the survey is
shown in the Figure 15(b) in Appendix C. We conduct the survey
using reviews generated at a temperature of 0.7, which gave the
best performance from the previous round. Also, in this round, we
test on 80 restaurants and hire 5 workers for each restaurant. The
rest of the survey configuration remains the same as the first round.
We received all 400 responses and discarded 5 of them for failing
the gold standard review. The average usefulness score of false
negatives (unflagged machine-generated reviews) is close to that
of true negatives (unflagged Yelp real reviews): machine-generated
reviews have an average usefulness score of 3.15, which is close to
the average usefulness score of 3.28 for real Yelp reviews. That is to
say, workers think of unflagged machine generated reviews almost
as useful as real reviews.
Overall, our experiments find machine-generated reviews very
close to mimicking the quality of real reviews. Furthermore, the
attacker is incentivized to generate reviews at high temperatures,
as such reviews appear more effective at deceiving users.
6https://www.mturk.com/mturk/help?helpPage=worker#what_is_master_worker
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Figure 8: Performance of human judgment on detecting
machine-generated review.
5 DEFENDING AGAINST
MACHINE-GENERATED REVIEWS
In this section, we propose a supervised learning scheme to detect
machine-generated reviews with high accuracy.
Assumption. We assume that the service provider has access to a
limited set of reviews generated by an attacker’s language model
and a set of real reviews available on the review site.
Why is defense challenging? Fundamentally, we are trying to de-
velop a machine learning classifier capable of detecting the output
of another MLmodel. In an ideal scenario, this seems impossible, be-
cause the generator model and detector are likely using the exactly
same metrics on the same inputs (or training datasets). Thus, any
metric that an ML detector is capable of detecting can be accounted
for by the ML-based generator.
Key Insight. Figure 9 shows the key intuition behind our defense.
While we expect that an attacker is aware of any metric used by
the ML detector for detection, we can find a sufficiently “complex”
metric where accurately capturing (and reproducing) the metric
requires an extremely large RNN infrastructure that is beyond the
means of most attackers. This leverages the fact that a generative
language model builds a fixed memory representation of the entire
training corpus, which limits the amount of information that can be
learned from a training corpus. More specifically, we observe that
text produced naturally (e.g., by a human) diverges from machine
generated text when we compare the character level distribution,
even when higher level linguistic features (e.g., syntactic, semantic
features) might be similar. Such divergence in the character level
distribution is primarily due to the information loss inherent in the
machine-generation process, which is a function of the modeling
power of the RNN used.
We note that the character level distribution metric is appropri-
ate for our purposes, because it is the lowest level metric being
modeled by our RNN, and therefore most likely to become a com-
plexity bottleneck for the RNN. An attacker might consider an RNN
generator that trains using word-level distributions. Fortunately
(for our purposes), word-level distributions are more complex and
difficult to model, both because the number of words is combi-
natorially larger than number of valid characters in the English
Limited Size Model
Training Reviews Generated Reviews
Figure 9: Key insight of our defense. During the training pro-
cess, the language model builds a fixed memory represen-
tation of the large training corpus and its representativity
is limited by the model size. The information loss incurred
during the training would propagate to the generated text,
leading to statistically detectable difference in the underly-
ing character distribution between the generated text and
human text.
language, and because such a model would need to add additional
rules for valid punctuation. Therefore, an RNN generator target-
ing word-level distributions would be even more computationally
constrained (thus incur more information loss), and intuitively, our
defense would work at least as well as on a character-level RNN.
5.1 Proposed Methodology
More concretely, consider the following attack scenario: The at-
tacker trains on a set of human generated reviews RT and builds a
character-level RNN language model M, to generate a set of reviews
RF. Even when RT is chosen in such a way that RF becomes linguis-
tically similar to the real reviews RL on the site, we can statistically
detect variations in the character level distribution between RF and
RL.
Algorithm 1 provides details of the method. The service provider
maintains access to the set of known machine-generated reviews
RF, along with the set of real reviews RL, and aims to determine
whether a given test review T is fake or real. Based on our insight,
we expect the character-level distribution of reviews in set RF to
statistically diverge from that of reviews in set RL.
The character-level probability distribution P(Xt+1=xt+1|x1, ..., t),
gives the probability of predicting the next character, given the
sequence of preceding characters. To capture the divergence in the
character distribution, the defender first builds an RNN language
model RNNF using the set of machine-generated reviews RF and
another language model RNNL using RL. Next, given a test review
T , we feed the review, character by character, into each RNN model
to obtain two character distributions, providing statistical repre-
sentations of review T for each model. Finally, if the log-likelihood
ratio of the test review’s character distribution closely fits the model
RNNF, then we flag the review as fake.
5.2 Defense Evaluation
We evaluate our defense scheme along two directions. First, we
study the detection performance of our scheme and how it compares
to an ML scheme based on linguistic features (Section 4.1). Second,
we investigate the robustness of our approach to evade detection
against two attacker strategies.
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Figure 10: Performance of proposed defense and linguistic classifier (Sec-
tion 4.1).
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Figure 11: Detection performance given
different sizes of defense training sam-
ples.
Algorithm 1 Proposed Defense
▷ input-RF:machine-generated review training set, RL:real re-
view training set, T:test review
1: procedure Defense(RF, RL, T)
2: N← length(T)
3: RNNF ← trainRNN(RF)
4: RNNL ← trainRNN(RL)
5: for t = 1:N-1 do
6: feed Xt into RNNF
7: LF ← PF(Xt+1=xt+1|x1, ..., t)
8: feed Xt into RNNL
9: LL ← PL(Xt+1=xt+1|x1, ..., t)
10: Lt ← − log LLLF ▷ negative log-likelihood ratio
11: L¯ ←
∑N-1
i=1 Li
N-1
12: if L¯ > 0 then
13: return FAKE
14: else
15: return REAL
We follow a standard RNN model training process to train RNNF
and RNNL. We refer to them as defense RNN. Unless otherwise
stated, we report performance on 2,000 test reviews (balanced set
of real and machine-generated reviews) in the remainder of this
section.
Detection Performance. To first understand the performance in a
potential best case scenario, we evaluate our scheme by considering
a large amount of ground-truth information. Our ground-truth set
consists of 120K machine-generated reviews, from our Yelp attack
dataset (Section 3.3), and 120K additional real reviews. We set the
model configuration for the defense RNN to be the following: 1,024
hidden units, 2 hidden layers, batch size of 128 and 20 training
epochs.
As a baseline for comparison, we compute detection performance
using the ML scheme described in Section 4.1, which we refer to as
the linguistic classifier. Note that the ML scheme is based on high
level linguistic features and trained using the same ground-truth
set of machine-generated and real reviews. We expect the linguistic
classifier to perform better than the results in Section 4.1 because
the training data now includes machine-generated reviews that we
aim to identify directly.
Figure 10 shows the detection performance when we train and
test on text generated at different temperatures. Our approach
achieves high precision and recall at all temperatures, i.e. over 0.98
precision and 0.97 recall. Additionally, we outperform the linguis-
tic classifier at most temperatures, and the gap between the two
schemes increases at higher temperatures (e.g., temperature > 0.6).
At temperature 1.0, our scheme achieves an F-score (the harmonic
mean of precision and recall) of 0.98, while the linguistic approach
only achieves an F-score of 0.55. Interestingly, the linguistic classi-
fier shows high detection performance at low temperatures. This
trend can be explained by our earlier finding that linguistic features
diverge more from the real reviews at low temperatures (Figure 7).
Next, we study performancewhenwe limit the amount of ground-
truth used for training and focus on text generated at temperature
1.0. Figure 11 shows performance when training data size varies
Training
Samples
Hidden
Unit Size
Layer
Size
Batch
Size
Training
Epoch
2K 128 1 16 50
10K 256 1 32 50
20K 512 1 56 30
100K 768 2 128 20
200K 1,024 2 128 20
Table 3: Training configurations of defense models when de-
fense training sample size varies.
Hidden
Unit Size
Training
Samples
Layer
Size
Batch
Size
Training
Epoch
128 10K 1 32 50
256 50K 1 56 50
512 100K 1 128 30
768 500K 2 256 20
1,024 617K 2 256 20
2,048 617K 2 256 50
Table 4: Training configurations of attack models when at-
tack model size varies.
from 2,000 to 200K samples. Each training dataset is a balanced
dataset of machine-generated and real reviews. The RNN model
configuration used for defense for each training set size is detailed
in Table 3. Our scheme significantly outperforms the linguistic clas-
sifier for all datasets and achieves a high F-score of 0.80 using only
1,000 machine-generated reviews (2,000 training dataset). Consid-
ering the fact that service providers have taken considerable effort
to build large fake review datasets (∼250K fake reviews in Table 1),
1,000 reviews is a relatively small sample of known fake reviews.
Thus, unlike the linguistic classifier, our defense scheme performs
well with highly limited ground-truth information.
Evading Detection by Increasing Attack Model Quality. The
attacker can evade detection by improving the quality of the RNN
generative model or increasing the memory size of the model. A
higher quality model would generate more “natural” text, and thus
reduce the divergence in the character distribution. However, this
strategy comes with a higher cost for the attack. Training a larger
RNN model requires more training data to be collected, more com-
putational resources (e.g., GPUs with more memory and computa-
tional capacity), while also imposing additional training time. It is
hard to quantify the increase in attack cost when accounting for all
these factors. Instead, we focus on the impact on training time as
the attacker varies model quality to evade detection.
We vary the attack model size (number of hidden units) from
128 to 2,048. We also vary other model parameters, and the size of
the training dataset to avoid underfitting or overfitting. Details of
the attack models are described in Table 4. For the defense RNN,
we use a configuration based on 2K training samples in Table 3.
Figure 12 shows the tradeoff between decreases in detection per-
formance (F-score) and increases in training time for the attacker.
In general, when the attacker trains a larger model, our defense per-
formance would degrade: when doubling the model size from 128 to
256 cells, detection performance drops by 3.95% with training time
increasing by 71.86%. As the model size grows further, attacker’s
gain in evasion rate slows, while the matching training time accel-
erates significantly. This is due to the increase in computational
complexity: from model size 1,024 to 2,048, defense performance
only decreases by 2.70% but the attacker’s training time raises by
435.1%.
In practice, larger models would require a significantly larger
training set as well. For example, Jozefowicz et al. [21] trained a 2-
layer RNN with 8, 192 hidden units on a dataset with ∼0.8B words,
14x larger than our training dataset, to achieve state-of-the-art
model performance. Therefore, the computational cost and amount
of training data required to train a larger model would become
prohibitively expensive for all but the most resourceful attackers.
Next, we show there are other ways to further diminish the
power of any resource-based countermeasures by the attacker. We
observe that our defense scheme performs better on longer reviews,
as the scheme has more data to capture divergence in the character
distribution. Based on this observation, we propose a simple policy
for the service provider to further raise the bar for evasion: set amin-
imum review length. Figure 13 shows how detection performance
varies as we increase the minimum review length requirement
against an attack model with 1, 024 hidden units. Note that the
average review length on Yelp Training Data (Section 3.3) is 483
characters. When we increase the minimum length requirement to
300 characters (i.e. still below the average), F-score increases from
0.80 to 0.86, which nullifies the attack success gained by increasing
model size from 512 to 1,024 hidden units (from Figure 12). This
means that the attacker now must aim for training a significantly
larger attack model, at the expense of increased training cost, to
overcome the reduction in attack success.
Evading Detection by Generating Reviews at Different Tem-
peratures. When reviews from a language model are detected
as fake, one would expect the attacker to build a new language
model (thus raising the cost) for the next attack. Instead, the at-
tacker can try to evade further detection by generating new reviews
using the existing model, by changing the temperature parameter
(without re-training). While our scheme can detect reviews at dif-
ferent temperatures when we have ground-truth information at
those temperatures (Figure 10), performance remains unclear when
ground-truth information is unavailable. Put differently: Using a
defense scheme trained on reviews at a specific temperature, can we
detect reviews generated at other temperatures? If this is possible,
it would allow the service provider to defend against such attacks
without having to collect new ground-truth information.
We investigate the above scenario in Figure 14, where we train
the linguistic classifier and our scheme at a specific temperature
(Ttrain) and evaluate detection performance at all other tempera-
tures (Ttest). Both Ttrain and Ttest are from 0.1 to 1. The training
configuration is same as the one used for 2K training samples in
Table 3.
As expected, the linguistic classifier exhibits poor defensive
power at higher temperatures. At low temperatures, we see that a
defense trained at a given temperature maintains effectiveness at
temperatures in the “neighborhood” of that region, possibly due to
similar linguistic characteristics in the temperature neighborhood.
However, the performance drops quickly when Ttrain and Ttest are
far apart.
On the other hand, our approach shows an interesting trend.
Unlike the linguistic classifier, our performance maintains robust-
ness whenever Ttrain > Ttest. This is because a review generated
at a high temperature would include both infrequent and frequent
patterns from the training sequence. As a result, a defense trained
at a higher temperature can capture the frequent sequences present
in the character distribution of a review at a lower temperature.
Hence, our defense scheme maintains high performance even when
Ttrain and Ttest are distant as long as Ttrain ≥ Ttest. It should be
noted that the attacker has an incentive to generate reviews at high
temperatures because they are more likely to deceive users (Sec-
tion 4.2). As such, the service provider can likely obtain some initial
ground-truth information about reviews at high temperatures, and
thus build a robust defense.
6 RELATEDWORK
Text Generation. There are a number of natural language gen-
eration techniques based on pre-defined templates [57, 58, 67, 71].
These systems usually require some domain knowledge and well-
designed rules. Recently, learning-based approaches became popu-
lar, i.e. building a statistical model to learn the language information
from a large corpus. In these cases, the quality of the generated text
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Figure 12: Detection performance against attacks generated
by different models and their training costs.
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Figure 13: Detection performance when the minimum review
length is restricted.
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Figure 14: Detection performance (F-score) of training and
then applying at different temperatures.
highly correlates with the model quality. Previous work shows that
well-trained RNN models outperform simpler language models like
N-gram [21] and RNN-based language models have appeared as
a promising approach to generate text [14, 68]. Researchers have
also achieved successful results in generating text for different
domains, including email responses [23], image description [24],
movie dialogues [64] and online social network conversations [65].
Our work is closest to studies by Lipton et al. [33], Hovy [17]
and Lappas [27]. Lipton et al. [33] also studies product review gen-
eration using an RNN, but does not consider an adversarial setting.
Hovy [17] performed a preliminary investigation of n-gram-based
review generation in an adversarial setting. Unlike our research,
they do not consider more sophisticated generative models (RNN)
to evade detection, and do not consider any robust defenses or
countermeasures. Lastly, Lappas [27] analyzes fake reviews from
the attacker’s perspective to determine the factors that enable a
successful attack, but does not consider automatic generation of
reviews.
Neural Networks and Security.Most prior studies on applying
Neural Networks focus on improving existing defenses against
various network and web security vulnerabilities. Work in this
category mainly includes proposals to improve network intrusion
detection [8, 25], malware classification [62, 66, 83], and password-
based authentication systems [39].
Similar to our work, a few studies also investigate the feasibil-
ity of attacking online systems using Deep Neural Networks. This
includes proposals to automatically solve CAPTCHAs using Con-
volutional Neural Networks [13, 60], and automatically generate
malware domains using Generative Adversarial Networks [1]. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to explore attacks
on online review systems using Deep Neural Networks.
Crowdturfing and Review Spam Detection. Prior work char-
acterized crowdturfing marketplaces that supply human labor to
enable attacks on a variety of online platforms, such as review sys-
tems, social media, and search engines [29, 74, 75]. In addition, work
by Wang et al. investigates detection of malicious crowdworkers
using machine learning and explores the robustness of machine
learning classifiers against evasive tactics by crowdworkers. Fur-
thermore, researchers have extensively studied detection of opinion
spam or fake reviews in online review systems using features based
on review content [32, 48, 53] and a variety of metadata [10, 19, 20].
We differ from these studies by focusing on automatically gener-
ating fake reviews that can evade detection by advanced machine
learning classifiers and human investigation.
7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this work, we focus on the potential for misuse of deep learning
models in the context of attacking online review platforms. Our
work shows how RNNs can generate deceptive yet realistic looking
reviews targeting restaurants on Yelp. An extensive evaluation of
the quality of generated reviews indicates the difficulty in detecting
such reviews using existing algorithmic approaches, and even by
human examination (which serves as an end-to-end test of our
attack).
We propose a novel approach to defend against RNN-based fake
reviews, by leveraging a fundamental limitation of an RNN-based
model: information loss incurred during the training process when fit-
ting a large training dataset to a fixed size statistical model.Due to the
information loss, generated reviews diverge from real reviews when
comparing their character-level distribution, evenwhen higher level
linguistic characteristics are preserved. Our scheme, based on su-
pervised learning, can detect machine-generated reviews with high
accuracy (F-score ranging from 0.8 to 0.98 depending on the amount
of available ground-truth) and outperforms existing ML-based fake
review filters.
FutureWork. In terms of potential future work, one direction is to
consider the role that user and contentmetadata can play in both the
attack and defense perspectives. Metadata can be crucial in terms of
deceiving users (e.g., by increasing the number of friends/contacts
on the site) and in assisting defenses [10, 19, 20, 31, 47, 72, 76] (e.g.,
by analyzing the patterns in timestamps of user activites). Orches-
trating the general behavior of user accounts using deep learning
to bypass metadata based defenses could be an interesting research
challenge. Second, while we limit ourselves to the domain of on-
line review systems and fake review attacks, deep learning-based
generative text models can be applied to launch attacks in other
scenarios as well. We highlight two of these possible application
scenarios.
Strengthening Sybil Attacks. Attackers can use our techniques to
generate realistic looking text-based user behavior patterns [4], e.g.,
posting, commenting and messaging. This can help attackers make
Sybil (fake) accounts indistinguishable from legitimate accounts
based on textual content. A special case of this involves launching
an impersonation attack in online social networks [11].
Fake News Generation. Identifying fake news, i.e. “a made-up story
with an intention to deceive” [61], currently remains an open chal-
lenge [9]. The research community has started to explore the possi-
bility of automating the detection process by building an AI-assisted
fact-checking pipeline [41, 73, 77]. We believe that AI can not only
assist fake news detection but also generate fake news. Given the
availability of large-scale news datasets [69], an attacker can poten-
tially generate realistic looking news articles using a deep-learning
approach (RNN). And due to its low economic cost, the attacker
can pollute social media newsfeeds with a large number of fake
articles.
We hope our results will bring more attention to the problem
of malicious attacks based on deep learning language models, par-
ticularly in the context of fake content on online services, and
encourage the exploration and development of new defenses.
A REVIEW CUSTOMIZATION DETAILS
We show the details of review customization process (Section 3.1)
in Algorithm 2.
B MORE EXAMPLES OF THE GENERATED
FAKE REVIEWS
We present examples of generated reviews targeting a specific
restaurant (description shown below). The samples are generated
under different temperatures and from the models trained using
five-star, three-star and one-star Yelp training review corpus.
Target Restaurant Description
ExperienceMKT, a market-to-table San Francisco restaurant and bar. Taste your
way through ultra-creative handcrafted cocktails, small plates for sharing, and
steaks from the finest California ranches. Meet friends and relax in our retro
urban-chic atmosphere. In the heart of SoMa - with panoramic fifth-floor views
of Market Street and downtown - this is one of San Francisco’s best restaurant
venues for social drinks and dining.
B.1 Machine-generated One-Star Reviews
Generated with temperature 0.1
I was so excited to try this place out for the first time and the food was awful. I
ordered the chicken sandwich and it was so salty that I could not eat it. I was so
disappointed that I was so disappointed in the food. I was so disappointed that
I was so disappointed with the service.
Generated with temperature 0.3
I had a drink at this restaurant. I was there for a couple of months. The restau-
rant was clean but the food was not good. The service was very slow and the
service is so bad. I would not recommend this place to anyone.
Generated with temperature 0.5
The worst place I’ve ever been too. I waited for a while and the place was not
available and the service was absolutely terrible. The server was rude and not
apologetic and unprofessional. I will not be going back to this location.
Generated with temperature 0.7
I have been here twice, very expensive for what you get. We stayed here before
at our table and were seated in a line for 15 minutes and the restaurant was
full and the cashier recommended the drinks and they forgot the cookie cover
charge and we were told it was not an issue. I would never recommend this
place to anyone.
Generated with temperature 1.0
DONOTWASTE YOUR TIME ANDMONEY! The absolute worst service I have
ever experienced. This place is a joke. The waitress was rude and said she would
put the manager to come out but never happened. I wish I could give zero star.
B.2 Machine-generated Three-Star Reviews
Generated with temperature 0.1
The food was good but not great. I had the lasagne and the sauce was a little
too sweet for my taste. The salad was good but the sauce was a little too sweet
for my taste. The sauce was a little too salty for my tastes. The sauce was a little
too sweet for my taste.
Generated with temperature 0.3
I’ve had the fried chicken and the chicken breast with chicken soup with sweet
potato fries. I don’t know what a lot of the meat was on the salty side as well.
The sauce was a bit salty and didn’t have much flavor. The salad was tasty and
well presented but the bread was super tasty.
Generated with temperature 0.5
I was here for a weekend brunch and the food was ok. I love the pizza that is
a chain restaurant. I think the service is excellent. I had the spaghetti and they
were very good and the hot dog was good. I got the red velvet chocolate cake
special which was very good but the service was a little slow. The food was
good, but not up to par with other places nearby.
Generated with temperature 0.7
Algorithm 2 Review Customization
▷ input: R-initial review, T-reference review set, C-topic key-
word, MINsim-similarity threshold
1: procedure Review Customization(R, T, C, MINsim)
▷ find nouns in R close to C
2: P← ∅
3: for t ∈ T do
4: for n ∈ Nouns(t) do
5: if similarity(n, C) > MINsim then
6: P← P⋃ n
▷ find nouns in R also close to C, replace by sampling from P
7: for n ∈ Nouns(R) do
8: if similarity(n, C) > MINsim then
9: S← ∅
10: for p ∈ P do
11: S← S⋃ similarity(n, p)
12: z← softmax(S)
13: n∗ ← sample from P based on z
14: replace n by n∗
15: return R
The food wasn’t bad. The cupcakes are okay and the service is excellent but the
prices are a bit high. I do like the fresh made salad and drink specials. I would
recommend this place for a place to grab a bite for a couple of times.
Generated with temperature 1.0
Came here for lunch today and the place was pretty empty. The steak was good
but the chicken they had a little less oily and overcooked. I would recommend
this place if you are looking for a cheap place to stop by.
B.3 Machine-generated Five-Star Reviews
Generated with temperature 0.1
I have been going to this place for a few years now and I have never had a bad
experience. The service is great! They are always so friendly and helpful. I will
definitely be back and I will be back for sure!
Generated with temperature 0.3
This place is amazing! The bartenders are absolutely amazing. The pasta is de-
licious and I love their pastries and it is amazing. I love the breakfast, friendly
staff and the price is very reasonable. I have never had a bad experience here. I
will be back for sure!
Generated with temperature 0.5
I love this place. I went with my brother and we had the vegetarian pasta and
it was delicious. The beer was good and the service was amazing. I would defi-
nitely recommend this place to anyone looking for a great place to go for a great
breakfast and a small spot with a great deal.
Generated with temperature 0.7
I have been a customer for about a year and a half and I have nothing but great
things to say about this place. I always get the pizza, but the Italian beef was
also good and I was impressed. The service was outstanding. The best service I
have ever had. Highly recommended.
Generated with temperature 1.0
The food here is freaking amazing, the portions are giant. The cheese bagel was
cooked to perfection and well prepared, fresh & delicious! The service was fast.
Our favorite spot for sure! We will be back!
C SCREENSHOTS OF USER STUDY SURVEYS
C.1 Fake/Real Review Detection
Figure 15(a) shows a screenshot of the survey designed for examin-
ing human performance on machine-generated review detection.
C.2 Review Helpfulness Rating
Figure 15(b) shows another screenshot of the second round sur-
vey designed for collecting the helpfulness score of the machine-
generated reviews.
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